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Reducing governments’ use of credit ratings may be the single most 
important step toward improving the credibility of ratings agencies, and
reducing investors’ undue reliance on them.
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FINANCIAL SERVICESCredit rating agencies have been blamed for their role in the recent financial crisis, notably for
having assigned high ratings to complex financial instruments that yielded billions in losses
to investors. As a consequence, a number of reforms have been proposed or introduced –
including for example increased disclosure of rating methodologies. This Backgrounderargues
that reducing the government use of credit ratings may be the single most important step
towards restoring the credibility and integrity of rating agencies. 
Over the years, governments have incorporated credit ratings into various regulations,
ranging from regulations related to the amount of capital banks must hold to regulations that
require some investors to invest in securities bearing high ratings. Credit rating agencies have
therefore become, in addition to their traditional role as providers of third party credit risk
assessments, providers of “regulatory licences” that allow market participants to meet
regulatory requirements or obtain favourable regulatory treatment. 
The regulatory use of credit ratings reduces incentives for credit rating agencies to compete
on the quality of their ratings and may lead to less diversity in rating decisions. It also
contributes to the artificially high demand for highly rated financial instruments, which
increases incentives to create increasingly complex and often opaque financial instruments.
To the extent that the regulatory use of credit ratings has contributed to investors’ undue
reliance on ratings, reducing their regulatory use should also help restore investors’ own due
diligence. 
This Backgrounder accordingly recommends replacing references to credit ratings in
government regulations. The proposed alternatives are internally generated ratings, market-
based measures of risk and non-risk-based measures such as minimum investment amounts.
To the extent that some regulatory use of credit ratings may still be warranted, this
Backgrounder proposes the introduction of a registration and approval process for credit
rating agencies based on performance that would enhance their incentives to compete on the
basis of rating quality. Finally, this Backgrounder supports the provisions of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions Code of Conduct. 
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C
redit-rating agencies (CRAs)
currently are the target of
criticism for their role in the
recent financial crisis. They are being
blamed notably for having assigned
high ratings to complex financial
instruments that yielded billions in
losses to investors.
1
In response, governments and international
organizations have made numerous proposals for
reform related to CRAs, ranging from increased
disclosure of rating methodologies to the creation of
public-sector agencies. This Backgrounder argues that
reducing the regulatory use of credit ratings is
perhaps the single most important step toward
restoring the credibility and integrity of CRAs. 
An Emerging Problem
Since the publication of Moody’s Analyses of Railroad
Investments in 1909, CRAs have become an essential
fixture of financial systems. CRAs addressed an
important element of the asymmetry of information
between buyers and issuers of debt by providing the
former with an independent evaluation and assessment
of the latter’s ability to meet their debt obligations.
Prior to the introduction of CRAs, the specialized
financial press and other sources had provided investors
with information and statistics about issuers. The main
innovation of CRAs was to summarize all relevant
information into a simple rating system in which each
rating symbol provides an indication of the relative
creditworthiness of a company.
CRAs’ sole function for much of their history was
to provide an independent evaluation and assessment
of credit risks to investors. To compete and even
survive in such an environment, a CRA needs a great
deal of reputational capital – that is, it needs to be
perceived by investors as a provider of credible and
unbiased credit ratings. Investors, therefore, provide
natural checks and balances that compel the CRA to
supply the most accurate ratings possible. Even under
an issuer-pay model,
2 a CRA has a vested interest – at
least on an ongoing basis – in providing reliable
ratings, since issuers pay only for ratings that enhance
the marketability of their debt, and unreliable ratings
do not achieve that purpose. 
Over time, however, governments began
incorporating credit ratings into various regulations,
deeply affecting the business model of CRAs. In
1975, the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) established the notion of “nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations”
(NRSROs), initially to allow broker-dealers
3 to hold a
smaller capital cushion against securities deemed
investment grade by such organizations (Securities
and Exchange Commission 2008). The use of the
term NRSRO has now become widespread in SEC
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The author is grateful to Darryl Brown, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, David Laidler, Alexandre Laurin, Phil Marleau, and Finn Poschmann,
among others, for useful comments but remains responsible for any errors and omissions.
1 For example, close to 90 percent of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) issued in the United States between 2005 and 2007 that had been
rated AAA by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) were downgraded as of June 30, 2009, most of them below investment grade (International Monetary
Fund 2009, ch. 2). In retrospect, some of the assumptions underlying the ratings of such instruments were overly optimistic.
2 Until the early 1970s, CRAs relied on investors for their main source of revenues by charging subscription fees. CRAs now derive most of their
revenues from issuers of securities.
3 A broker-dealer is an organization that trades securities for its own account or on behalf of customers.
“The ratings are simply a set of symbols maintained by private businesses, who
operate, not in a controlled laboratory, but in the real world of economic incentives.
Regulatory use of ratings is changing the economic incentives of the industry, and
that is starting to change the ratings themselves. ”
Former Executive Vice President, Moody’s Investors Services
(Moody’s Investors Services 2009, p. 2)| 2 Backgrounder 130
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4 Canadian securities regulations refer to an “approved rating organization” or an “approved credit rating organization,” while the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) makes reference to an “external credit assessment institution” for capital adequacy purposes.
For example, see National Instruments 51-102 and 81-102 and OSFI Guideline A-1.
5 In addition, institutions using the internal-rating-based approach may use credit ratings to derive their own internal rating estimates.
6 For example, Kisgen and Strahan (2009) analyze the rating methods of DBRS before and after it was deemed an NRSRO in the United States
in 2003 and conclude that “the data suggest that DBRS rates bonds more like other major agencies after becoming an NRSRO.”
7 There is some compelling evidence that some form of rating shopping occurred in the run-up to the recent financial crisis. For example, S&P’s
criteria for ratings CDOs backed by corporate debt – a market in which S&P had a dominant share – included a relatively generous
assumption of zero correlation between industries (Nomura 2006).
rules and in other rules, guidelines, regulations, and
statutes in the United States.
The story is similar in Canada, where a plethora of
federal and provincial laws and regulations make
reference to credit ratings. Unlike the United States,
however, Canada has no single uniform definition of
which credit ratings can be used for regulatory
purposes.
4 Nevertheless, most of the definitions are
restricted to ratings issued by the big four CRAs that
are active in Canada – namely, DBRS, Fitch Ratings,
Moody’s Investors Service, and S&P.
The most common uses of credit ratings in
Canadian laws and regulations are as follows (see
Table 1 for more details):
￿ Capital adequacy. Banks and other federally regu-
lated financial institutions must set aside an amount
of capital against their risk-weighted assets as a
cushion for losses. To help determine the riskiness of
their assets, some institutions can use credit ratings
under the so-called standardized approach, or when
generating ratings internally is impossible or difficult
such as with securitization exposures.
5The amount
of capital insurance companies must hold is also
partially based on credit ratings.
￿ Eligible investments. In an effort to minimize risk,
some regulations require particular types of investors
to invest only in securities bearing high credit
ratings. Money market funds must invest in debt
instruments that are considered low risk by ratings
agencies (the equivalent of an A rating from S&P
for long-term debt). OSFI also uses credit ratings 
to determine which financial instruments banks can
use as collateral against the lending of securities.
￿ Distribution of securities. The distribution of
securities is subject to a number of regulations
intended to protect investors. Provincial securities
regulations require most securities to be issued
and distributed with a prospectus, a legal
document that provides investors detailed
information about the security. In certain
circumstances, a favourable rating allows
securities to be distributed without a prospectus
or with a so-called short-form or shelf prospectus. 
The Unintended Consequences of the
Regulatory Use of Ratings
A direct consequence of regulatory references to
credit ratings is that CRAs have become providers
not only of credit assessments, but also of “regulatory
licenses” that allow market participants to meet
regulatory requirements or to obtain more favourable
regulatory treatment (Partnoy 1999). This increased
role has important implications for the behaviour of
both providers and users of credit ratings.
The use of ratings by governments gives CRAs
approved by regulators an almost guaranteed market,
since regulated market participants must use their
ratings for regulatory purposes. It also increases
barriers to entry, as it is difficult for new ratings
agencies that are not yet recognized by regulators to
gain acceptance in the marketplace. Thus, an almost
guaranteed market, coupled with limited
competition, reduces the incentives for officially
recognized CRAs to compete on the basis of ratings
quality. In a sense, market discipline increasingly is
being replaced by “government discipline.” The fact
that the use of credit ratings increasingly depends on
government acceptance rather than on the extent to
which they provide real value to market participants
might negatively affect the quality of credit ratings.
Further, investors and governments often have
contradictory objectives as users of credit ratings. For
regulatory purposes, governments prefer ratings that
are interchangeable and homogeneous,
6 otherwise
debt issuers can simply shop around for the most
favourable rating.
7 Investors, on the other hand,
value ratings that give them an edge in support ofBackgrounder 130 | 3
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Table 1. Credit Ratings in Canadian Regulations, Guidelines, and Rules, Overview of Selected References
Sources: Canadian Securities Administrators (2008); The Joint Forum (2009); OSFI Guidelines; Provincial securities regulators’ National Instruments;
Investment Industry Regulatory Organizations of Canada Rules.
Regulation, Guideline, or Rule Purpose
Capital requirements, banks and
trust and loan companies (OSFI
Guidelines A and A-1).
Credit ratings issued by certain CRAs can be used to assign a risk weight to an exposure
in determining the amount of capital an institution must hold as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets.
Capital requirements, federally
regulated life insurers (OSFI
Guideline A).
Life insurers must hold minimum levels of risk-adjusted capital. Many of the risks
factors related to asset defaults, which are used to determine the amount of required
capital, depend on credit ratings.
Capital requirements, federally
regulated property and casualty
insurance companies (OSFI
Guidelines A and A-2).
To determine the amount of capital an insurance company must hold, assets are divided
into three categories – government grade, investment grade, and non-investment grade –
based on credit ratings.
Prudent person approach, federally
regulated financial institutions
(OSFI Guideline B-1).
By law, the board of directors of a financial institution is required to establish, and the
financial institution is required to adhere to, “investment and lending policies, standards
and procedures that a reasonable and prudent person would apply.” As per guidelines,
financial institutions should set limits on investments and loans according to their
quality; credit ratings may be used in establishing quality criteria.
Securities lending, all federally
regulated financial institutions
(OSFI Guideline B-4).
To be considered eligible collateral in securities lending, instruments must bear a
minimum credit rating.




An institution investing or holding senior tranches or providing second or subsequent
loss enhancements can, under certain conditions, use credit ratings to determine the





Securities issued or guaranteed by the Government of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, as well as any other national foreign government, provided the
securities are rated AAA, are subject to lower margin requirements – that is, the amount
of collateral that must be set aside for a given position.
Short-form prospectus eligibility
(National Instrument 44-101).
One criterion for being able to distribute securities under a short-form prospectus
requires that the securities bear a credit rating above a certain threshold.
Shelf prospectus eligibility
(National Instrument 44-102).
Issuers can use a shelf prospectus to distribute certain types of securities provided the





The securities of a foreign government as well as short-term debt such as commercial
paper can benefit from registration and prospectus exemptions if the securities receive a




Money market funds must invest 95% of their net assets in cash, cash equivalent, and
debt instruments that are considered low risk by ratings agencies.8 For example, Brister, Kennedy, and Liu (1992) show that the high yield of bonds with low ratings (inversely to their relatively low prices) reflects
not only their high probability of default, but also a regulatory effect.
9 As a recent example, many of the private-label mortgage-backed securities that were downgraded during the recent financial crisis are now being
repackaged and sliced into tranches, most of which have regained their AAA status. This process, known as “re-remics,” is motivated at least
partially by rating regulatory arbitrage (International Monetary Fund 2009, ch. 2).
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their investment decisions, which should lead to
more diversity in ratings decisions. Diversity in
opinion in general is important to counterbalance
the herd behaviour that characterizes the booms and
busts of financial and economic cycles.
In addition, since banks, insurance companies,
and money market mutual funds, among other
regulated investors, are compelled to invest in highly
rated financial instruments or receive preferential
regulatory treatment from doing so, the regulatory
use of ratings artificially increases the demand for
such instruments – although other factors, such as
internal investment criteria, also help to explain the
high demand for them.
8
The high demand for financial instruments that
bear high ratings provides every incentive for market
participants to get creative by, for example,
packaging and repackaging debt into increasingly
complex and sometimes opaque financial
instruments bearing higher ratings than the debt on
which they are based would commend.
9 In the
context of the recent financial crisis, the high
demand for financial instruments bearing high
ratings contributed to the high demand for the sub-
prime mortgages that were backing some of these
instruments, helping the development of lax lending
standards and the ensuing housing bubble.
Recommendations
The use of credit ratings in government regulations
creates a number of perverse effects. This
Backgrounder accordingly recommends replacing
references to credit ratings in government
regulations. Regulations could continue to achieve
their objectives if they referred instead to market
participants’ internal assessments of credit risks, to
market-based measures of risk such as bond spreads,
or to non-risk-based measures such as minimum
investment amounts. 
Regulations Relating to Capital Adequacy
Banks and other federally regulated financial
institutions must set aside a sufficient amount of
capital to guard against potential losses. Under
current capital adequacy rules, banks as well as trust
and loans companies can use internal ratings models
to determine their amount of required capital,
provided certain conditions are met. For larger
institutions, the use of internal ratings models is a
good alternative to the use of credit ratings since it
would encourage diversity of opinion about credit
risk in the marketplace while allowing regulators to
have a say in the adequacy of the process by which
credit risk is assessed.
To be permitted to use proprietary internal models,
institutions should demonstrate to their supervisors that
they meet established requirements in terms of their
ability to rank and quantify risk and that their manage-
ment practices are consistent with evolving guidelines
issued by regulators. Regulators could continue to use
third-party benchmarks such as credit ratings but only
to supplement their judgment about the validity of the
risk-management practices of regulated institutions and
of their ability to rank and quantify risk. Relying on
internal models – with appropriate checks and balances
by regulators – would reduce the tendency of some
regulators and market participants to rely blindly on
credit ratings to assess credit risks. 
To the extent possible, regulators should encourage
the use of internal ratings models by both banks and
trust and loan companies. Federally regulated life
insurers and property and casualty insurance
companies, however, do not currently have the
option of using internal ratings models for regulatory
purposes. Canadian regulators thus should work on
developing regulations that would allow these
institutions to use internal ratings models, provided
they meet certain requirements in terms of their risk-
management practices.
Regulators should allow smaller institutions that
might lack technical expertise to use market-based
measures of risk, such as bond spreads, to determine
their capital requirements. Bond spreads – measuredBackgrounder 130 | 5
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as the difference between the yield to maturity of a
particular bond and the yield on a low-risk bond,
such as a government bond, with comparable cash-
flow characteristics and maturity – are not perfect
measures of credit risk, but they nonetheless reflect
investors’ perception of the riskiness of a security and,
therefore, can be an adequate alternative to credit
ratings for regulatory purposes. Bond spreads reflect
not only credit risk, but also the liquidity – the ease
with which a bond can be sold – of a particular
bond, which, in many circumstances, is actually an
advantage for regulatory purposes since it provides a
more complete assessment of the riskiness of a bond.
Bonds spreads also might reflect factors unrelated to
risk, notably differences in tax treatment.
There are, however, relatively straightforward
methods around these issues such as the use of credit
default swaps instead of government bonds – which
are subject to lower tax rates in some jurisdictions –
in calculating the low-risk yield. Bond spreads are
also more volatile than credit ratings, so that a simple
moving average of bond spreads over some period –
say, 30 to 90 days – could be used for regulatory
purposes (Partnoy 1999).
For financial instruments that are scarcely traded
and illiquid, bond spreads and other market-based
measures of risk are not appropriate regulatory
alternatives to credit ratings.     
Regulations Relating to Eligible Investments
Government regulations require some investors to
invest only in securities with high credit ratings in
order to minimize the risk they take. Currently, for
example, money market funds must invest 95
percent of their net assets in cash, cash equivalents, or
debt instruments that ratings agencies consider low
risk (the equivalent of an A rating from S&P for
long-term debt). In instances where the board of
directors of a fund and its regulators determine that
the board has the ability to rank and quantify risk
appropriately, references to ratings should be replaced
by internal assessments by the board. As argued
earlier, internal assessments of risk encourage
diversity of opinion about credit risk in the
marketplace while allowing regulators to have a say in
the adequacy of the process by which risk is accessed.
In other instances, references to credit ratings should
be replaced by market-based measures of risk. 
Federally regulated financial institutions – when
providing securities lending – must use financial
instruments that bear a minimum rating to be
considered eligible collateral. Again, this reference to
credit ratings should be replaced either by internal
assessments or by market-based measures of risk. 
Regulations Relating to the Distribution of
Securities
As noted, provincial securities regulations require
most securities distributed in Canada to be accom-
panied by a prospectus that conveys appropriate
information to investors so they can make informed
investment decisions. One criterion for being able to
distribute securities under a “short-form prospectus”
– a prospectus that allows the incorporation of
certain information by reference to other documents,
thereby reducing the disclosure required in a
prospectus – is that the securities bear a credit rating
above a certain threshold. Similarly, issuers can use a
“shelf prospectus” – one that allows issuers to qualify
large amounts of securities for subsequent issuance –
to distribute certain types of securities provided the
issuer has reasonable grounds that the securities
would receive a rating above a certain threshold.
These references to credit ratings can simply be
removed. Criteria already in place, such as the
requirement that the issuer publish a current annual
financial statement, are sufficient to ensure that
enough information is available about the issuer to
investors on an ongoing basis (Canadian Securities
Administration 2008).
Furthermore, the securities of a foreign
government can benefit from registration and
prospectus exemptions if they receive a rating above a
certain threshold. The idea behind exempting highly
rated foreign government debt is that such
investments are relatively low risk – even though high
levels of government debt currently are raising doubt
about the ability of some governments to meet their
obligations – and are relatively simple investment
products. Again, references to credit ratings in
exempting government debt could be replaced by a
restriction that only debt issued by governments that
are designated by rules or regulations as having
relatively low risk of defaulting on their debt should
benefit from the exemption (Canadian Securities
Administration 2008).| 6 Backgrounder 130
Short-term debt, such as commercial paper, also
can be exempted from registration and prospectus
requirements because it is considered relatively low
risk due to its short-term maturity (less than one
year) and investors likely require less information
about it than about riskier investments to make
informed decisions. The exemption, however, should
exclude more complex securities such as synthetic
asset-backed commercial paper (see Canadian
Securities Administrators 2008), while references to
credit ratings could be replaced by a minimum
purchase amount, which is a good proxy that the
buyer is sophisticated enough to assess the riskiness
associated with a short-term debt instrument.
Instances Where Ratings Might Still Be Warranted 
In some cases, it might not be feasible or even
desirable to eliminate all regulatory references to
credit ratings. For relatively small institutions that
take a position in thinly traded financial instruments,
there does not appear to be any viable regulatory
alternatives to third-party opinions about credit risk.
Such institutions often do not have the internal
capacity to generate credit-risk estimates for
regulatory or other purposes. Further, the use of
market-based measures of credit risk, such as credit
spreads for regulatory purposes, is not a viable
alternative to internally generated credit-risk estimates
in the case of thinly traded financial instruments –
such as complex, over-the-counter derivatives – since
their lack of trading activity means that the market
price might not reflect adequately their riskiness. 
The lack of a liquid market, coupled with the
limited ability of an institution to provide internal
assessments of credit risk, points to the need for
external assessments of credit risks. In these limited
instances, regulators might allow for the use of credit
ratings issued by CRAs for regulatory purposes.
10To
mitigate the perverse effects associated with the
regulatory use of credit ratings – namely, that it
provides approved CRAs with an almost guaranteed
market, makes entry of new CRAs more difficult,
and reduces the incentive of approved CRAs to
compete on the basis of rating quality – the
certification process associated with determining
which CRAs can be used for regulatory purposes
should be improved.
Currently, there is no established process for
registering and approving CRAs whose ratings can be
used for regulatory purposes.
11 Accordingly, to
minimize the harmful consequences associated with
the regulatory use of credit ratings, regulators should
put in place a formal, transparent regime to register and
approve such CRAs. More specifically, the historical
accuracy – say, over the past five years – of a CRA’s
credit ratings above some minimum threshold relative
to that of its peers should be the basis for approving
their use for regulatory purposes. Regulators, therefore,
would approve only CRAs with a proven track record
of accuracy in assessing credit risks. Such a system
would realign incentives for CRAs to compete on the
basis of ratings quality, while the adoption of a formal
registration and approval regime would make it easier
for new CRAs to establish themselves, ultimately
leading to higher levels of competition in the provision
of credit-rating assessments.           
Overall Recommendation
Taken together, these changes would greatly reduce
the regulatory reliance on credit ratings. Such use,
however, is so deeply entrenched in the functioning
of the financial system that any changes should be
made gradually and with appropriate levels of
consultation with all the parties involved.
Furthermore, since many CRAs operate globally,
Canadian regulators should work, to the extent
possible, in concert with foreign regulators and
international organizations. 
C.D. Howe Institute
10 It has been proposed that governments themselves establish the capability to carry on the business of a CRA, becoming providers of credit risk
estimates for regulatory purposes. For example, Bill S-230 – An Act to amend the Bank of Canada Act (credit rating Agency) – that was tabled in the
Canadian Senate during the second session of the 40th Parliament but that was never adopted, provides for the establishment of a credit rating
agency by the Bank of Canada. This avenue, however, is fraught with potential pitfalls, including the potential for political influence on the
credit-rating process.
11 In the United States, in contrast, under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, a CRA may apply to the SEC to be considered an NRSRO,
but must, among other things, make available information on the procedures and methodologies it uses to determine credit ratings and on the
performance of its credit ratings.Backgrounder 130 | 7
In addition, while these changes are central to
restoring the credibility and integrity of CRAs, reducing
the regulatory use of ratings is not by itself a panacea. As
with any model, the issuer-pay model presents potential
conflicts of interest that might incite some CRAs to
alter their ratings for short-term gain.
12 Governments
therefore should ensure that CRAs operate under the
highest standards in terms of the quality and integrity of
the rating process, their independence and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and their responsibility
to the investing public and issuers.
Accordingly, governments should ensure that CRAs
operating in Canada do so according to the provisions
of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct.
13The
code stipulates, among other things, that:
￿ A CRA should prohibit its analysts from making
proposals or recommendations regarding the
design of some complex financial instruments
that a CRA rates;
￿ a CRA should separate, operationally and legally,
its credit rating business from any other
businesses of the CRA, including consulting
businesses, that may present a conflict of interest;
￿ a CRA should disclose the general nature of its
compensation arrangements with rated entities;
￿ a CRA should publish sufficient information
about its procedures, methodologies and
assumptions so that outside parties can
understand how a rating was arrived at by the
CRA; and
￿ a CRA should differentiate ratings of structured
finance products (i.e., more complex financial instru-
ments) from traditional corporate bond ratings,
preferably through a different rating symbology.
Concluding Remarks
The use of credit ratings in government regulations
creates a number of perverse effects. Reducing their
regulatory use would enhance the normal checks and
balances provided by investors, increase incentives for
CRAs to compete on the quality of their ratings, and
should lead to increased diversity in rating decisions. It
would also reduce not only the artificially high demand
for highly rated securities, but also incentives to create
increasingly complex and often opaque financial
instruments. To the extent that the regulatory use of
credit ratings has contributed to investors’ undue
reliance on ratings,
14 reducing their regulatory use
should also help to restore investors’ own due diligence. 
This Backgrounder accordingly recommends
replacing references to credit ratings in government
regulations. For larger and more sophisticated
financial institutions, regulators should rely on
market participants’ internal assessment of credit
risk, as is currently the case for capital requirements
for banks. In other instances, market-based measures
of risk, such as bond spreads, should be used in lieu
of credit ratings for certain regulatory purposes.
Non-risk-based measures, such as minimum
investment amounts, could also be used in some
cases to replace references to credit ratings. In some
limited instances, however – namely, for relatively
small institutions taking position in thinly traded
financial instruments – the use of credit ratings for
regulatory purposes might still be warranted. This
Backgrounder further recommends that, if credit
ratings were still being used for regulatory purposes
in some instances, Canadian regulators put in place a
registration and approval process for CRAs based on
performance that would enhance their incentives to
compete on the basis of ratings quality. 
Finally, while these changes are central to restoring
the credibility and integrity of CRAs, reducing the
regulatory use of ratings is not by itself a panacea.
Governments should ensure that CRAs operating in
Canada do so according to the provisions of the
IOSCO Code of Conduct. However, without first
addressing the skewed economic incentives created
by the regulatory use of ratings, other regulatory
reforms are unlikely to achieve their intended results.
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12 Under an investor-pay model, for example, a large investor might pressure a CRA to produce lower initial ratings since securities with lower
ratings tend to provide higher yields.
13 Many of the provisions of the IOSCO code of conduct have already been adopted on a voluntary basis by CRAs operating in Canada.
14 For example, some investors might perceive the regulatory use of credit ratings to be a form of government endorsement of the quality of ratings.
More broadly, their regulatory use might create an environment in which ratings are considered the de facto measure of credit risk.C.D. Howe Institute
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